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The Governance of Services  
 
Pieter H.M. Ruys1 








Abstract: The problem of assessing a system of governance for composite services in the social 
economy is approached by means of original methods. The main innovation is that the welfare 
structure of a society is separated from the legal transaction- or institutional structure. As both 
the various types of services and the various modes of management are defined in terms of rela-
tions between sets of persons, these structures can be compared and the performance of a man-
agement-system can be assessed. The dynamics of a wide range of hybrid forms of organization – 
between market and hierarchy – is analyzed in this framework. The approach elaborates on the 
new institutional economics, and the social theory of micromotives and macrobehavior in ex-







1 Introduction  
 
Adam Smith has taught us that, although our goal in life is achieving welfare-values, we only 
can attain that goal by engaging in exchange transactions that generate monetary values. The 
separation between the set of all imaginable services and the governance required for manag-
ing and realizing a subset of these services forms the base of the analytical framework intro-
duced here.  
 
The design of a Social Economy, an extension of the Market Economy, requires new concepts 
and models. One of the new concepts to be modeled is the Service of General Interest (SGI). 
The dominant approach to analyze SGIs is to define this concept from the legal point of view 
in terms of institutions. In this paper I make a distinction between the welfare generating in-
teractions between persons, called services, and the legal transactions between organizations 
of persons required for managing the services, codified in governance. The service structure 
contains welfare generation as the driving force of society; the institutional structure focuses 
on transaction-value generation and describes the powers to realize services. The service of 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to Robert Gilles, René van den Brink, Eric van Damme, Theo Camps, and Jan Bruil for their 
remarks made on earlier versions. I am also grateful to the members of the International Scientific Commission 
“Public Services / Public Enterprises” of CIRIEC for their comments and the exchange of ideas in our working 
sessions. This research has been triggered off by students of the Tias Business School of Tilburg University who 
wanted to know the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. It took me 20 years to find a 
satisfactory answer.  
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general interest is one specific type of service that is an element of the service structure rather 
than the institutional structure. So both structures are described separately. They are also con-
nected, however, because legal transactions are required for managing and realizing the ser-
vices; and an institutional tool as governance is also service of general interest. The interac-
tion between the service structure and the institutional structure is described in the same rela-
tional framework. That approach allows for deriving criteria for governance from the charac-
teristics of the different types of services.  
 
A second departure from established neoclassical economic theory is that not commodities, 
but services are the corner stones of the theory. A service is a relation between interacting 
persons who generate welfare by means of the service. That way of modeling creates both 
opportunities and serious problems. Proponents of the relational and reciprocal approach are 
Hirsch (1976), Kolm (1984), and Gui (1994). Reciprocity may be analyzed in social networks 
and results in social capital, which is analyzed in a fast growing literature in sociology, start-
ing with Coleman (1990).   
 
The third departure from the important literature on “institutional structures of production” 
(Coase, 1991), or on “hybrid forms of organizations” (Williamson, 1991), is the extension to 
the consumer side and to the external organization of firms. The framework introduced allows 
for a symmetric treatment of producer and consumer organizations, such as voluntary and 
cooperative organizations constituting the ‘civil society’. Since the same person can play dif-
ferent roles, obeying different types of rationality, it may be called the role approach in gov-
ernance. 
 
Finally, the social economy can only be analyzed in connection with a market economy and a 
public sector. Concepts such as efficiency and consistency have only sense if one can com-
pare outcomes under various types of governance. That requires a general equilibrium frame-
work, which is also the fourth departure from the standard approaches. It is evident that this 
new approach is not fully elaborated, but the model can at least partly be reduced to the estab-
lished neoclassical microeconomic model.  
 
The motivation for this research was to get a better understanding of the the role and behavior 
of organizations in the public and non-profit sector of the economy. These organizations are 
also referred to as ‘hybrid organizational forms’ between market and government. What is 
their role in relation to the other organizations in society, and what kind of criteria one can 
apply to assess their efficiency and their contribution to value generation? In short, which 
governance contributes most to their value-generating performance? 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The relational framework is introduced in the next section 
on service relations between actors and contractual relations between parties. I analyze modes 
of governance for ‘pure’ services in Section 3, and introduce the dynamics of this approach. 
Hybrid forms of organization come close to actual policy problems and form the empirical 
base of this research. Section 5 concludes. The new concepts introduced are formally defined 




2 The relational approach: services, contracts, and organiza-
tions  
 
2.1 Services generating personal welfare; the service structure  
 
Consider a society with a finite number of persons. Those persons interact with each other, 
causing each other pleasure or pain. Some interactions are deliberate and reciprocal in the 
sense that two persons agree to act in a way that pleases the other and improves the welfare of 
both. These two persons, called actors, agree on a service between each other. An actor can be 
an individual or a group of persons, such as a teacher giving courses to a class of students, or 
a medical team performing a surgical operation on a patient. These examples show that actors 
in a service assume a role, either as performer, or as receiver. In each role, an actor consists of 
a group of interacting persons. 
 
So a service is a relational activity between persons whose interaction generates welfare for 
all involved. Every member of the society has a utility function defined on the set of services 
in which he or she is involved. A standard service2 is a service with a content that defines 
two roles: a group of receivers of the service, and a group of performers of the service. The 
size of each group is such that it contains all and only persons who interact in that role, so any 
external effect of an actor is internalized. In the sequel a service is understood to be a standard 
service.  
  
The definition implies that two services with the same content have the same characteristic 
relational form; but services with the same form may have a different content. For example, 
the service of selling ice cream on the beach and the service of selling soft drinks on the beach 
have the same form. It also implies that an actor, be it a team of service-performers or a 
club of service-receivers, is the smallest group of performers or of receivers cooperating and 
interacting with each other for that service.  
 
Let there be a finite number of different services in the service space, each with its character-
istic form. This service space is given a structure. A service may be very simple, such as buy-
ing an ice cream from a vendor, or very complex, such as safety provided by the police. These 
services may be ordered according to a nominal index from 1 to m, as commodities are or-
dered, but we also may order services according to the size of interaction between persons 
within an actor. Since the receiver of an ice cream is one person, the interaction with other 
persons is absent. On the other hand, the set of people receiving safety in a country covers the 
whole society and does not exclude one person; so all persons interact as receivers. A separa-
tion index on the set of receivers and on the set of performers is defined, going from 0 to 1, 
where 0 means no separation or full correlation between persons, and 1 means full separation. 
That allows us to characterize services according to their form. Since each service has a char-
acteristic form, we can design a typology of services. We simplify the separation index to 
three categories: 1. No separation, covering a single closed group; 2. Local separation: a few 
groups with limited exit possibility for members; 3. Global separation: many small groups 
with easy exit possibility for that service. Since there are two types of actors, receivers and 
performers, we distinguish nine types of services in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The service structure: value-generating relations between  
three types of performers and three types of receivers 
 
 
Table 1 represents the service structure, including the technology of taste and craft, both of 
receivers and of performers. A person needs personal capabilities to interact in any of these 
services, as well as the legal authorization from some contract parties. Authorization implies 
also acceptance of or submission to the institutional rules of the game, as encoded in a mode 
of governance in Table 3. In this approach a person chooses the institutional environment in 
which she feels good3, included possible egalitarian and ethical consequences of that choice 
for her. So the individual utility function on the service structure reveals indirectly the ethical 
norms and all other social values of the individual person, as far as these are manageable in a 
mode of governance. This two-stage decision resolves the problem of interpersonally compa-
rable utility as described by Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004). The set of all persons in society 
defines the scope of the Table 1. These persons have attributes in several dimensions, such as 
time (long and short run), space (global or local), or in the service content (from an all en-
compassing, comprehensive service to an irreducibly single service). The Separability Scale 
identifies the degree of separability in the characteristics. 
 
Service S11 is at the left extreme of the Separability scale. It fits the description of a closed 
community service; the interaction within each actor may be relatively communicative, emo-
tional, inspiring, and integrative. The individuality of a person in an actor-group may vanish 
                                                 
3 Her preference may include a preference for flexibility, see Barberà, Bossert, and Pattanaik (2004), to decrease 
uncertainty. 
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in the egalitarian and interactive values, but the service as such is valued by the individual 
person’s utility function. National celebrations for a country or religious festivities in a com-
munity are examples. From this type of service going to the right, we arrive at S12: ‘the com-
munity service by a professional team’. The receivers are still community-wide, but the group 
of performers is specialized in some task. One may think of a ministry in the government, a 
regulatory agency, or a professional group as teachers or the medical profession, but also offi-
cers with a public task for social housing service or transport infrastructure. The recently de-
fined ‘service of general interest’ (SGI) has a position in this field, because in this relation the 
community defines and receives the SGI and the professional group is the performer of the 
task. Although modes of governance belong to the institutional structure, they are also ser-
vices of general interest that are assessed by individual members of society4.   
 
When performers may compete for performing this service for the community, the service 
becomes a ‘service of general economic interest’ (SGEI), positioned in field S13: ‘Commu-
nity-wide business service by a private team’. An example is a private firm offering the ser-
vice of waste management to a local community. A service is called an economic service, if it 
can be processed by an economic system (see Section 2.2), so its transaction value is measur-
able in terms of money. A sufficient condition is that the performers can be split up in small 
units and can compete, which is the case for services in the last column. The service S23: 
‘Business service for a particular group by a private team’ can be interpreted as a security 
service offered by a private firm to a group of receivers, or a private school service, or a stan-
dard in a network industry, such as an word-editor with user-wide externalities. The most 
separated service is located in field S33: ‘Private business services’. The service is open to all, 
so impersonal, anonymous and global; both the receiver and performer are rational and utili-
tarian. A pure private service has no external interaction or relation: it is a ‘hit and run’-
service. It is a generalization of a neoclassical private good, as the performer who sells a car 
may - in this case - be identified with the commodity ‘car’. The receiver has also lost personal 
identity in the service relation and only has identity in that she has her own preferences over 
commodities, such as cars. This reduction to the bare essentials of an individual in an eco-
nomic decision situation is the cornerstone of neoclassical economics and has generated a 
deep insight in social decision making, with tremendous, practical consequences and benefits.  
 
In the bottom row of the Table 1, the receiver is not interacting with other receivers and the 
group of interacting performers varies in size. In service S32 there is a group of performers, 
such as a ballet, and a non-interacting audience with each other. This type of service reduces 
to a public good, when a commodity replaces the team of performers; a commodity from 
which no receiver can be excluded (the non-exclusive criterion) and no receiver (consumer) 
experiences external effects in receiving the service (non-rivalry). If the receivers in the thea-
ter interact in enjoying the performance, the service shifts up to the type S22: ‘Social service 
for a particular group by a professional team’, or equivalently, ‘a professional service for a 
group with special interests’. The particular group, or the group with special interests, is the 
audience in the theater in the example. This type contains a large set of civil services, or social 
services of general interest (SSGI), such as consumer-run projects and client organizations. 
These are the services of the ‘civil society’, indicated in grey fields of the Table 1.  
 
The dynamics of change of the service technology shows a trend from 0 to 1, a trend towards 
liberalization and individualization asks for private services that allow accountability, replica-
                                                 
4 This approach endogenizes transaction costs of institutions; see also Gilles, Diamantaras and Ruys (2003). 
Modes of governance may decrease uncertainty and increase flexibility, which institutional aspects are expressed 
in terms of services of general interest that are assessed by the individual members of the society.  
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tion, efficiency, specialization and rationalization. A trend in the other direction, from 1 to 0, 
is equally forceful. A need for cohesion, integration, and coherence asks for comprehensive 
and protective community services. I propose to formulate these trends in terms of two ‘laws 
of motion’ in Section 3.3. 
 
The individual utility of a service is best explained in terms of subjective expected utility. The 
individual has to assess not only the welfare generated by interaction between performers and 
receivers in which she takes part, but also the probability of realization of that type of service. 
This probability is strongly increased by a mode of governance supporting the management of 
a certain service. The first point, the welfare-value generated by interaction, is more difficult 
than traditional way of asking an individual receiver to reveal – directly or indirectly – infor-
mation about her individual preference ordering of a set of commodities. If there are sufficient 
substitutes or alternative performers available, such as for private services in the field S33, then 
that procedure can be applied again. In the case of a group service, the individual receiver 
may compare different groups or different intensities of group activities, as is done with as-
sessing public goods by a utility function. In case of a community service, the assessment of 
potential alternatives is the subject of social choice theory. The derivation and determination 
of welfare-indicators falls outside the scope of this paper5. 
 
2.2 Contracts, managed services, and transaction value 
 
There are many potential services in the service structure. Only some of these will be selected 
and realized, namely the services that are managed into realization. There are, for example, 
many places where you may go on vacation, which are possible services between your group 
– the receivers – and some other group – the performers – the travel industry. The manage-
ment of your vacation requires a contract between your group and the travel industry. You 
have to be authorized to enter that transaction and to pay the bill. The travel agency should 
have the power to provide the service and to engage an airline, hotels, and so forth. These are 
all elements of a contract aimed at realizing a specific service. 
 
So a service-contract is a formal agreement between two parties, both having the force of 
law or custom to exchange resources and commitments, to create the conditions for rendering 
that service. A transaction is the act of carrying out the exchange through to an agreement. 
The two parties are the procurer of a service, which is a set of persons that has the power to 
obtain necessary resources from its constituency for realizing some service, and the provider 
of a service, which is a set of persons that has the power to provide the service with the re-
sources received. The terms of trade for this transaction is called the transaction-value. 
These terms are determined by the system of governance in force; in a market economy these 
is expressed in terms of money, it may also be votes6, relational assets, payment in kind, or a 
social means of exchange. 
 
So a contract is defined on the same set of persons as the service was. The goal of all rela-
tional effort by persons, welfare-interaction, is defined in the service-space; the tool, transac-
tion-value, is defined in the contract-space. Tools being separated from goals, we are now 
                                                 
5 See also the report Services of General Economic Interest in Europe. Regulation, Financing, Evaluation, Good 
Practices, 2000, published by CEEP, Brussels, and CIRIEC, Liège. 
6 This has been proposed by Anthony Downs (1957). 
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able to assess the performance of tools such as management and governance for a wide range 
of services.  
 
First, a map is designed which gives a typology of contracts, comparable to the service-map in 
Table 1, based on the transaction-power needed for some contract. Assuming that every group 
has authority over its members according to the subsidiarity principle, there exists a corre-
spondence between the size of a group and its power, we define a decentralization index on 
the set of partners going from 0 to 1, where 0 means centralized authority over the combined 
aspects of a service and over all members of the society, and 1 means decentralized authority, 
but over single aspects of a service. The decentralization index represents transaction-power, 
which can be interpreted in terms of political power (votes), social power (reputation) or eco-
nomic power (money). The exchange or transaction values are determined and expressed in 
these terms. The more power is separable and decentralized, the smaller is the group that re-
ceives such power. So there exists a correspondence between power and the size of a group7. 
 
We again simplify the index to three categories: 1. Centralized transaction power attributed to 
a single group by and over its members (public powers), who have no exit options; 2. Local 
transaction powers, which are attributed by and over the members of a local organization; 
members have limited exit options; 3. Decentralized transaction power (private powers); im-
plies competition between many agents based on voluntary transactions. Since there are two 
types of agents, procurers and providers, we distinguish nine types of contracts in Table 2, for 
each with an example in accordance with the transaction-power or legal competence of the 
contract-partners. 
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Table 2. The map of contracts and terms of transactions based on a party’s legal competence 
 
 
                                                 
7 Li (1999), for example, argues that self-governance in groups is a diminishing-returns system optimal on a 
small scale, whereas a formal state legal system is an increasing returns system that becomes better beyond a 
certain scale of economic activity. Dixit (2002) has modeled this idea.   
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The contracts in the top-left field concern comprehensive, complex services and are con-
cluded between only two parties – the legislative and the executive – which may cause the 
distinction between being blurred, unless a good constitution separates both powers. A ‘social 
contract’8 in which the legislature legitimizes by means of laws societal goals as well as the 
coercion required by the executive for obtaining resources to realize these goals, forms the 
basis of this transaction. This type of transaction is therefore called a ‘legitimating for admini-
stration’ or government transactions and placed the field T11 of Table 2, where ‘legitimating’ 
may be considered as a generalization of a (market)price for some complex administrative 
service. The basic distinction between public law and private law goes back to the Roman 
republic.  
 
Economic transactions in the right column are characterized by full decentralization of trans-
action-power, causing the transaction-value being fully expressed in terms of money9. The set 
of legal persons in private law is also well defined and is not equal to the set of natural per-
sons in a society: one has to meet certain competence criteria. In addition, there exist legal 
persons representing a group of people having some common purpose. 
 
A private service with a high degree of separation – in the bottom-right fields of Table 1 – can 
always be realized by a centralized contract, although it is not efficient to do so. But not vice-
versa: a public service with a low degree of separation cannot be realized by decentralized 
contracts. So a contract Tij is said to be feasible for some service Skl , if  ji ≤  and ≤k . A 
managed service is defined as a service that has a feasible contract. A managed service is 
contract-efficient, if a contract with a higher degree of decentralization cannot feasibly ren-
der the service any more. Finally, the transaction loss of some contract is defined10  as the 
excess of transaction-power used to realize a service.  
 
 
2.3 The firm; interaction between service-technology and internal organi-
zation 
 
The various concepts introduced above can be applied on the management and organization of 
a private firm producing a private service. The firm’s service is a welfare-generating relation 
between performers and receivers. The performers, engaged and organized by the provider, 
are positioned at the front of the organization and interact with the receivers, generating wel-
fare-value: see Diagram 1. The value-transaction is a relation between the firm (provider) and 
customers (procurers). The provider of the service is specialized in managing an organization 
of performers and in selling their services. Its CEO is legally competent to engage in transac-
tions, as employer (principal) in internal transactions, and as producer (agent) in external 
transactions. The customer (procurer) purchases the service of the performers for a receiver, 
who in the case of private services is the customer herself. The CEO at the top of the organi-
                                                 
8  Introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) in his Du contrat social, ou principes du droit politique. 
9  It follows that in a market system transaction-values can be attributed to the labor of individual persons – if 
some conditions are met – which allows for using concepts as the ‘market value’ of a product or a person. Ne-
glecting the human and social values of an integral person, we arrive at a slave market. So it is the historical 
value-complex of a society that determines economic value. 
10  The formal definitions can be found in the Appendix. 
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zation – representing the provider – generates the transaction-value with the customers (pro-
curers)11. 
 
The internal organization of the firm is a nexus of managed services aimed at enhancing the 
productivity of the service performers of the firm, which is based on cooperation. The size of 
the organization also depends on the external organization of the firm, based on competition 







Diagram 1. Internal and external management of services  
 
 
The interaction between the service structure and the organizational structure follows from the 
fact that when the structure of services – the production function – has been given, the man-
agement will choose an organizational structure that maximizes the transaction-value of the 
firm. A Cobb-Douglas function, in which labor – the performers – can be substituted, causes 
the management to prefer a deep organization. A flat organization fits best for a Leontief pro-
duction function. Van den Brink and Ruys (2005) show that the management determines the 
internal organizational structure top-down, depending on the form of the production function. 
The problem is more complicated, of course, for the choice of sector governance, such as 








                                                 











3 The governance of pure services 
 
3.1 Rationality and governance 
 
Whether contracts are used for internally organizing a firm, or according to the external or-
ganization between firms, they mould human behavior. For people to understand and use 
these often complex rules, regularity is helpful if not indispensable and diminishes transaction 
costs. The concept of ‘transaction between parties’ is a fundamental cornerstone in the social 
sciences, as is the regularity in contracting behavior, which defines the social concept of ra-
tionality. Rational behavior by a person in a specific role is understood as standard behavior 
for all persons in that role, which can be modeled as optimal behavior for each person in that 
model-context. It has been shown, for example, that an entrepreneur in a market economy 
with pure private goods behaves rationally if he maximizes profits. The benefits of rational 
behavior, however, are not necessarily for the individual entrepreneur (his individual context 
is never identical with the model-context), but rather for the economy as a whole. Schelling 
(1978) has described this interaction between micromotives and macrobehavior, which inter-
action can be described by evolutionary models. And Adam Smith (1776) already showed that 
when all people in a market economy were systematically behaving rationally, then society 
will gain. An efficient allocation will result upon nobody can improve with voluntary ex-
change. Corruption, for example, may be individually rational for an entrepreneur, but as sys-
tematic entrepreneurial behavior it will ruin the performance of entrepreneurs in a society. So 
it cannot be a part of rational behavior. Rational behavior is social behavior, often culturally 
determined, but not all social or cultural behavior is rational. The benefits of rational behavior 
are the systematic properties, such as consumer orientation, efficiency, growth, transparency 
of individual behavior and predictability of market behavior: prices, supply and demand will 
move to equilibriums when people behave rationally. No wonder that this system, which is at 
the root of political economics, has been governed carefully by the government.  
 
3.2 Modes of governance 
 
Modes of governance belong to the meta-level in the hierarchy of structures introduced here. 
They determine the rules of the game for the contract-parties and are needed to support and to 
enforce the transactions on the contract level. North (2005:62) calls the whole set of rules 
determining social behavior of organizations the institutional matrix of society. When these 
organizations are partitioned into service-providers and service-procurers, I call the rules gov-
erning their behavior a management-system or – following Dixit (2003) – a mode of gov-
ernance. Dixit focuses “on the governance of economic transactions, that is, enforcement of 
contracts.” He observes that all economic transactions (…) offer opportunities to cheat, and 
therefore need governance. However, much of economic theory assumes that an official legal 
system provides this service, both perfectly and costlessly. That is a strong assumption for 
most countries. So alternative modes of governance emerge, sometimes coexisting with the 
official legal system. In his paper, Dixit (2003) develops a model of governance by private 
for-profit intermediaries, and relates this mode to self-governance on the one hand and the 
official legal system on the other. In this paper, I develop a model of governance that covers 
more than economic services and transactions. The motive for governance is also different: it 
is the plain inability to manage a service by a provider without sufficient legal and social 
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power to realize the conditions required for rendering that service by the two interacting part-
ners, the receiver and the performer of the service.  
 
A mode of governance is composed of standard transactions derived from rational behavior. 
So the governance-systems can be characterized along the same lines as the map of contracts 
in Table 2. A transaction implies reciprocity and a kind of equilibrium or countervailing 
power between the two parties and defines the terms of exchange between these two parties. 
This check-and-balances is fundamental when analyzing governance-systems. 
 
The Government-system, G11, has a procurer with a political rationality and behavioral rules 
and norms. It is the Legislator, designed to identify community interests and services by 
means of the political system and to generate acceptance of burdens required for realizing 
these community services. The provider is the Executive who receives public powers from the 
Legislative and may use force upon members to realize the contracted community services. 
The internal organization of the administration has roots in the bureaucracy of the 19th cen-
tury, as described by Max Weber.  
 
The Market system, G33, is based upon voluntary exchange between buyer and seller. The 
buyer is called a procurer, because she has the means to realize her wishes. She usually also 
assumes the role of receiver of the service. She has private norms and interest, which she real-
ize through market rationality. The seller is the provider, who usually employs performers 
who interact with the receivers. He has a commercial rationality and behavioral norms.  
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Table 3. Modes of governance characterized by  
the transaction power of the contracting parties 
 
 
The Stakeholder system, G22, is composed of providers’ and procurers’ organizations with 
voluntary access, but with an own internal organization that is not fully based on voluntary 
participation. Examples are: the rules of cooperatives, of professional organizations, or of 
religious congregations (the rule of Benedict is a famous management-system, defining social 
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codes of behavior aimed at preserving specific social values), non-profit organizations, et cet-
era. 
 
The top row of Table 3 is characterized by public resources made available by the commu-
nity-wide procurer or legislator to obtain services of general interest. The executive may be 
the Administration system, G11, characterized by full public powers, or public agencies, G12, 
exercising power on a partial domain, such as a ministry or another public organization, with 
a  rationality of such an organization used to be close to Mintzberg’s professional bureauc-
racy. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are situated in field G13,.where public services are 
outsourced to private providers.  
 
The left column of Table 3 consists of modes of governance that legitimize the execution of 
public tasks with public powers. The first is the public support, usually not organized. Next is 
the public Interest-group system, G21, where parties are formed with particular values that 
they try to impose on the administration. Examples are: political parties, but also pressure 
groups adhering apartheid, or fundamental ideologies. The field G31 contains systems of direct 
democracy in which voters don’t interact with each other. It may be noticed that Arrow’s im-
possibility theorem applies to a specification of this mode of governance! 
 
In this context, the concept of the governance of a service is described as the care and cure of 
the management system for that service, reckoning with external effects on the whole society. 
It is concerned with defining people’s role and setting standards for their behavior in the con-




3.3 Dynamics and growth in the governance structure  
 
Since both the services and tools of management change in type over time, the correspon-
dence between a service and its management is only temporarily adequate and contract-
efficient. The computer is a good example of a service that required local centralization in the 
seventies and is fully decentralized today. The telephone industry is a good example of an 
originally compound service that developed in a composite service. When services as long 
distance and short distance networks, the operations of phone calls and the installation of tele-
phones were closely correlated, a centralized management system was efficient. Technologi-
cal innovation and legal procedures pushed this compound service into a composite service 
that could be separated in a single service and be provided by competitors, which made un-
bundling and a decentralized market regime feasible. This trend of shifting a type of service 
and its corresponding institutional change from the left-upper corner to the right-lower corner 
in Table 3 can also be observed in soft sectors, as health and education. North (2005:119) 
identifies this decentralization process as a shift from personal to impersonal exchange, which 
requires institutions to alter the pay-offs in exchange to reward cooperative behavior. Those 
new institutions change the economy and cause its growth, according to North.  
 
The inverse trend, from the right-lower corner to the left-upper corner, is equally important 
and also context-dependent. When privatization has disrupted connections between the ser-
vices that were present before the separation and decentralization, new services such as civil 
services or regulation may restore the cohesion between privatized services. When too many 
exchanges have become anonymous and impersonal, people look for new services that offer 
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coherence, certainty, security and protection. People ask for more fairness and fine-tuning in 
the modes of governance, which ethical values require somehow more cooperation and cen-
tralization. That all asks for the design of more sophisticated and stronger12 modes of govern-
ance.  
 
Both trends contribute to growth, but the term growth is ambivalent. Economic growth is 
measured in monetary terms by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This type of growth 
benefits directly from the first trend, because the increase of marketable private services di-
rectly adds directly to GDP. The Anglo-Saxon growth policy13 stresses this type of growth, 
which is based on the trend of separation, and on the belief that technological progress will 
cause the vanishing social services to be replaced eventually by private services in the mar-
kets. So it a question of accepting the burden of transition costs, with voluntary assistance and 
private generosity taking away some of the pain. Hirsch (1976) and others have pointed on 
other drawbacks of this philosophy for developed economies. On the other hand, proponents 
of the European social economy focus on the second trend. They describe growth in a wider 
perspective, including benefits for the civil and durable society. But in my opinion, these so-
cial services have to be integrated in the economic system. If one thinks that growth in wel-
fare goes without growth in transaction-value, or without integrating the services of the civil 
society into a social economy with a decentralized market system, one waits for a miracle that 
will never show up. It is essential to improve the governance for those services such that the 
transaction-value of these social services and of the services of general interest increases in 
terms of money.  The problem is, of course, that the contracts for these services – in the mid-
dle fields of Table 2 – are usually weak with respect to validation and verification. Coopera-
tion and voluntary organizations imply more stakeholders and usually less accountability. 
Contracts in the bottom-right fields allow for competition, which implies a degree of external 
organization with validation and enforceability (Greif, 1993).  
 
The two trends mentioned above are driven by human forces such as welfare maximization 
and enhancing power to control. These forces must explain the dynamics in society. I propose 
two ‘laws of motion’ that explain the two trends above, one for the service structure and one 
for the governance structure.  
 
Let us assume that we can compare, for some society at a certain time, the total governance 
capacity of a society with the service capability of that society: a kind of production frontier. 
If there is an excess supply of total governance capacity of a society over its service capabil-
ity, there is a governance surplus. Such a surplus exists if people expect that they can find 
sufficient opportunities and resources for their individual capabilities, and for realizing the 
potential services they see into actually managed services. So providers are willing to entry 
innovative and competitive markets, and procurers are willing to take risks as they trust the 
rules of the mode of governance. Aghion and Howitt (2005) have elaborated on this ‘Schum-
petarian paradigm’ and show empirical evidence. This Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ 
also applies to modes of governance, such as deregulation. In that situation people have a 
preference for tailor-made private and marketable services, stressing their individuality. On 
the other hand, there is a governance shortage if there exists an excess supply of total service 
capability over society’s total governance capacity. The actual mode of governance does not 
offer opportunities for realizing individual capabilities and desires, or people are not happy 
                                                 
12  Fukuyama (2004) draws attention to the need of the building and strengthening of states. 
13 This policy model is called the “Washington consensus” and consists of combining full market liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization. It has failed in many developing countries. 
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with the private services offered. In that situation people have a preference for group services, 
where they may lose some individual identity but find egalitarian and common values. This 
implies a demand for more integrated types of services and ‘creative construction’ of more 
sophisticated modes of governance.  
 
This governance surplus or shortage may be felt society-wide, in a sector, or even within an 
organization. It is a relative concept in that it serves to identify the context giving orientation 
to social forces. This context is determined by cultural and sociological factors, as well as by 
economic conditions and ‘transaction costs’ of governance. I summarize this regularity in the 
following ‘laws’ of motion. 
 
First Law of Motion (on the service structure): 
If there is a governance surplus, then individual welfare is increased by creating more 
separated types of services. If there is a governance shortage, then people care more 
for integrated types of services.  
 
So in case of a governance surplus, people value taste differentiation to meet own preferences. 
This is the private product-variety model of economic growth. The type of service preferred 
shifts from the left to the right in Table 1, or from the top to the bottom. But this shift is usu-
ally complemented and counterbalanced by the creation of a more integrated service. How-
ever, in case of a governance shortage, people value group services they can trust and give 
cohesion. The type of service preferred shifts from the right to the left in Table 1, or from the 
bottom to the top.  
 
In the service structure, the driving force for movements is personal welfare. In the institu-
tional structure, the driving force is increase in power from transaction-values. These forces 
interact. Contract-efficiency increases both transaction-value and the trend of decentralization 
of a mode of governance. But it usually goes with a complementary centralized mode of gov-
ernance to manage the coordination of the newly decentralized decisions. Centralization in-
creases transaction-value and the power derived from it. It has, however, to be counterbal-
anced by a complementary decentralized mode of governance to legitimize and manage the 
control by the decentralized stakeholders. These regularities are expressed by the following 
law of motion. 
 
Second Law of Motion: (on modes of governance) 
In the case of a composite service, a more decentralized mode of governance increases 
both the efficiency and the transaction-value of the decomposed services, but only if 
complemented by a more centralized coordination rule;  
In general, a more centralized mode of governance for a set of services decreases con-
tract-efficiency, but increases the transaction-value for the group in power.  
 
Empirical examples of this law have been given by Greif (1993), who analyzes the difference 
between a relation based system and a rule based system. It also explains the emergence of 
markets and of regulation, as observed by Ménard (2004). Bruil and Ruys (2005) present 





4 Governance of composite services 
 
4.1 From compound to composite services; aggregation of services 
 
The concept of a pure service serves to model the structure of services. In real life, there exists 
no pure service, just as the pure straight line exists only as a mathematical concept. If a real-
life service is a composition of more or less pure services, there are two options. One can 
draw satisfactory boundaries between the elementary services, in which case the service can 
be decomposed or unbundled into several types of ‘pure’ services that are related in a net-
work. That service is called a composite service. A service that is too interdependent in its 
various interactions to be decomposed, but relates groups of receivers and performers with 
different degrees of separation in a network, is called a compound service. Since all services 
in a society are related, one may conclude that there is only one, compound service. That does 
not help much, because its management cannot do more than serving everybody practically 
the same ration, which results in a low social welfare. So we may accept some fuzzy bounda-
ries within some compound service as clear boundaries separating some single services. This 
acceptance is determined by the trade-off between transaction costs and welfare benefits. The 
finer the delineation, the higher the welfare but also the transaction costs; the coarser the de-
lineation, the lower the welfare and transaction costs.  
 
So we consider most services in the civil society are composite services. Consider a health 
care service. A medical service may be a direct doctor-patient relation in S33; or group service 
in S32, such as a hospital-patient relation; or a prevention service in a community-patient rela-
tion in S31, such as a law against contagious diseases. All these relations include the individual 
receiver as an endpoint. From the performers point of view, we may distinguish again various 
types of relations. Apart from the direct doctor-patient relation in S33; we have a service by an 
interest group in S23, such as a charitable foundation engaging medical doctors; or a commu-
nity-performer relation in S13, such as a service of general economic interest in performing 
medical services. The fact that all types on the service map can be interpreted as medical ser-
vices shows the complexity of the health sector. Some services may be unbundled in a net-
work of pure services, but usually a number of compound services remain. Examples are in-
frastructural services and public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
 
The feasibility constraint requires aggregation of services. A first approach is to decompose in 
any composite service the labor service and to consider this service as a private service. That 




4.2 Hybrid forms of organization 
 
Technological progress and the increasing multiplicity in consumers’ wishes push a com-
pound service to a composite service. There are several managerial answers to this trend. The 
most efficient answer is to unbundle the organization managing the original compound ser-
vice, as discussed above. That leaves the problem of externally coordinating the various or-
ganizations, each with specialized tasks. Another option is to leave the task of providing the 
composite service to one organization, which now manages and coordinates the various single 
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services within that organization. The first option is called a hybrid arrangement; the second 
option is called a hybrid organization. Both types belong to the class of hybrid forms of 
governance. 
 
Ménard (2004) situates the large class of hybrid forms between markets and hierarchies, in 
line with Williamson (1991). He analyzes hybrid arrangements to discover regularities in the 
characteristics of interfirm networks. He focuses on multilateral agreements, because “multi-
lateral structures better reveal the key characteristics of hybrids”. Hybrids include, according 
to Ménard, arrangements as subcontracting, networks of firms, franchising, partnerships, co-
operatives, alliances, clusters of venture capitalists, and so forth. The common characteristic 
of hybrid arrangements is that they relay on partners who (i) are committed to make invest-
ments that create not only rents, but also significant and durable dependence, while (ii) prop-
erty rights and decision-making remain distinct. Two strategies are available.  
- Each partner develops specific assets, the resulting network being based on their com-
plementarities; 
- Partners decide to pool resources and to create joint investments for part of their ac-
tivities.  
Ménard substantiates the proposition that “the more specific mutual investments are, the 
higher are the risks of opportunistic behavior, and the tighter are the forms of control imple-
mented.” That again asks for forms of “private government, or authority”, for coordinating 
and policing the relationship. He observes that “what matters most for understanding what 
form of hybrid is chosen is the intensity of the interdependence, i.e., the degree of centraliza-
tion (italics are mine) and of formalization in the mode of governance required for coordinat-
ing and checking partners that are legally independent.” 
 
This observation fits perfectly with the classification criterion introduced in Table 2 for con-
tracts, and in Table 3 for modes of governance. Predictors for a high degree of centralization 
are, according to Ménard:  
- A high appropriation concern, which grows with the specificity of investment; 
- A high degree of consequential uncertainty, causing a high risk of opportunism; 
- A high risk of miscoordination, causing bad adaptation and flexibility, or caused b y a 
lack of control, and of safeguards;  
So when a high degree of centralization is required the mode of governance of a hybrid ar-
rangement will shift to the left in Table 3.  
 
Another observation concerns the change in the service structure of a hybrid arrangement. 
Ménard (2004:366) has “shown the presence of private government (or authorities” as distinct 
from “hierarchies”) as a core element in the architecture of hybrid organizations”. This sup-
ports the 2nd Law of Motion in that it shows the presence of a counterbalancing force towards 
cohesion, when the force of separation has moved services to the right, or to the bottom, of 
Table 1. That generates a new service, together with the unbundled services. It also explains 
why Montesquieu proposed a Trias Politica: the separation of the Legislation from the Execu-
tive requires a new independent service: the Judiciary. Regulatory Authorities or Agencies 
fulfill a comparable role, in the United States more so than in the European Union.  
 
The second type of a hybrid form is the hybrid organization. In that case the task of providing 
the composite service to given to one single organization, which now manages and coordi-
nates the various types of services within that organization. What mode or modes of govern-
ance will then be imposed by the organization for managing some type of service? Some pro-
pose a hybrid mode of governance for such a hybrid organization. In the Netherlands the 
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government tried to put separation of modes of governance into legislation14, but this proposal 
experienced strong opposition not only from the many hybrid organizations, but also from 
legal experts, see a.o. in ‘t Veld (1997), SCP (2000) and de Ru, Peters & Sylvester (2003). 
The discussion in the Netherlands, however, was very much a debate on normative issues and 
mostly politically biased. All agreed that the missing of a theoretical foundation caused this 
confusion. In a companion paper Bruil and Ruys (2005) analyze the governance of social 
housing sector from 1950 in the Netherlands and show that the social costs of a hybrid mode 
of governance are appreciable.  
 
The hybrid mode of governance for an organization is characterized by the fact that public and 
private competences and rationalities are intertwined. This has the effect that its transactions 
don’t fit any more the standard rules imposed by the external governance. It may disturb the 
level playing field and cause unfair competition. A hybrid organization may also select and 
mix arbitrarily decision and accounting rules from the two types of governance, causing a lack 
of transparency and inadequate accountability. That again hinders supervision. A hybrid mode 
of governance cannot meet the standards of good governance. 
 
Hybrid organizations, however, may have advantages. The first is the fact that cross fertiliza-
tion of behavioral standards may improve the overall quality of a service. Secondly, innova-
tion of services may produce services that don’t fit well in the existing moulds of governance. 
One needs to experiment with new forms to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Thirdly, tradi-
tional managerial solutions need innovation by incorporating new elements or internalizing 
external values. However, no general rule has yet been established to manage hybrid organi-
zations; therefore designing experiments and developing theory are appropriate. 
 
Hybrid consumer organizations are hardly mentioned in the literature, although many con-
sumer organizations exist. The reason is that these are considered ‘institution-free’, in the 
sense that anything will do, as it is costless. That is not correct, of course. One important func-
tion of this type of organizations is, in my opinion, to organize stakeholders and to legitimize 
the use of power (see Section 3.2). 
 
4.3 Governance polic, rationality, culture, and transaction costs 
 
What governance policy is to be preferred: letting management-systems emerge bottom-up 
from experience, or imposing them top-down? Two methods are distinguished. Usually both 
ways are combined, but for analytical reasons we prefer to separate them. Vernon Smith 
(2005) addresses the question of how rationality does evolve. He distinguishes two kinds of 
rationality. Constructive rationality derives from the standard socioeconomic science models 
based on the argument that all worthwhile social institutions were and should be created by 
conscious deductive processes of human reasoning15. It uses reason to deliberately create rules 
of action, and design human socioeconomic institutions that yield outcomes deemed prefer-
able, given particular circumstances, to those produced by alternative arrangements. The art of 
                                                 
14 Operatie Marktwerking, Deregulering en Wetgevingskwaliteit. A committee presided by M.J. Cohen (1997) 
proposed in its first report Markt en Overheid that a combination of public tasks and commercial activities in a 
single organization should be forbidden. Legal separation was not sufficient; full economic separation should be 
imposed, according to the proposal and also to the cabinet (Tweede Kamer, 1996-67, 24036;45). This proposal 
was strongly resisted by the many hybrid organizations in the Netherlands and until now no political consensus 
has been reached. 
15  This concept stems from Descartes, followed by Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the 19th century. 
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governing consists of designing such governance that the available human capabilities create 
the highest welfare-value.   
 
The second kind of rationality is an ecological system, designed by no one mind, emerging 
out of cultural and biological evolutionary processes: home grown principles of action, norms, 
traditions, and ‘morality’. People may follow rules without being able to articulate them, but 
they may nevertheless be discoverable by applying constructivist tools. It is the intellectual 
heritage of Adam Smith and Hayek, who described and interpreted the social and economic 
order they observed, and its ability to achieve desired outcomes, according to Vernon Smith. 
Both approaches are complementary: constructivism is a top-down approach, analyzing func-
tions of systems and setting criteria for performance; existing ecological rationality emerged 
bottom-up from the practical solutions invented by society. These practical solutions have to 
be scrutinized, as has been done by Greif (1993). However, just as practical medicine, man-
agement-systems cannot perform well any more without reconstructing and analyzing their 
functions. Those constructive tools for analyzing existing rationalities are presented here in 
this paper.  
 
The decisive factor determining the choice of management-system, top-down or bottom-up, 
will be the difference between the net transaction-value – that is the transaction benefits mi-
nus the transaction costs of some form of governance – and the welfare-value generated. 
Some systems of governance cannot process all types of services, and a fortiori cannot gener-
ate the corresponding welfare-value. Due to market failures, for example, the market cannot 
process public services. If one wants to provide these services, one has to change governance. 
But there may be circumstances that such a change involves additional transaction costs that 
are higher than the marginal welfare-value generated. Those services will then not be pro-




The purpose of this paper is to give the governance of services a firm foundation in the civil 
society.  The social enterprise and services of general interest contribute strongly to welfare-
interactions, but experience problems in generating value-transactions. This research may 






Appendix: Formal definitions and theorems 
 
Let N be a set of persons in a society and M a set of objects called services, and uN a utility 
profile on the set of services with ui 0.  
 
Definition 1 
A service Sm, Mm ∈ , is a relation NNm RRS ×⊂  between a set, Rm, of receivers and a set, 
Pm, of performers, such that mm PRjih ∪∈,,  if and only if  
.0}){\,()},{\( == jPRuPiRu mm
h
mm
h   
A service Sm is a standard-service if similar services have identical form, i.e., l=k, some l,k 
in M, implies Rl=Rk and Pk=Pl..     
 
So the set Rm contains all and only those receivers who interact within Rm, and the set Pm con-
tains all and only those performers who interact within Pm. It follows that all external effects 
between receivers or between performers are internalized. Furthermore, any standard-service 
has a unique relational form. 
 
Definition 2 












s =  for its performers. 
 
The complement of a separation index is its correlation index, representing the required inter-
nal interaction for professional competence or for the ability to enjoy a service. 
 
Definition 3 
A service is manageable if there exists a contract or transaction for that service, that is, 
Tq(Sp) for Qq ∈ , Mp ∈ , is a relation NNq RRT ×⊂  between a set, Xq, of  procurers and a 
set, Yq, of providers, such that pq ST ⊇ .    
So only a transaction Tkl , if jlik ≤≤ ,  in Table 2.can manage a service Sij in Table 1. 
 
Definition 4 












d =  for its providers. 
 
The complement of a decentralization index is the power index, representing the required in-
ternal interaction for legal competence. 
 
Definition 5 
A mode of governance Gq determines the terms of transaction for a contract Tq.  
 
Definition 6 
A manageable service is a service, Sp, and a contract, Tq, such that Tq(Sp) is feasible, that is, 
the terms of exchange for the transaction are empowered by the chosen mode of governance, 





A manageable service Sm(Tm) is contract-efficient if there exist no feasible service Sm(T)  
such that .mTT ⊂  An allocation of manageable services is efficient if it is feasible and no 
other feasible allocation exists that is weakly preferred by the utility profile uN.  
 
So the contract-efficient service can just be managed by the contract. A more decentralized 
transaction has not enough legal power. Notice that this efficiency concept is defined in the 
transaction structure. The efficiency concept is defined in the welfare-structure. It coincides 
with Pareto-efficiency in a private institutional setting, that is, the mode of governance em-
powers individual property rights and voluntary transactions. 
 
Definition 8 
A society is a specification of the concepts E = {N, M, (S, uN, s0 ), T (G)}, defined above, 
where s0 is the total labor services (resources) available in the society.  
 
Theorem 1 
Consider a corporate market economy, that is, a competitive economy in which a firm is a 
coalition Y of workers with an internal organizational structure and a cooperative pay-system 
– satisfying budget neutrality, vertical monotonicity and symmetry – with reservation wages 
determined by the markets, and with a Cobb-Douglas technology (see Diagram 1). Then the 
contract between the profit-maximizing coalition of workers in the firm and the coalition of 
owners of the firm is efficient.    
Proof: 
See van den Brink and Ruys (2005) for the uniqueness of the profit-maximizing size of the 
firm. 
 
This example shows that the relational approach creates an isomorphy between the service 
structure and the legal contract or power structure. That isomorphy performs as a medium 
between the two structures and allows for making a correspondence between the two. I  call it 
therefore the mediated-duality approach: there exists a common denominator to relate the two 
structures of relations between people. 
 
These cost represent the excess of legal power used, or the shortage of private information 
needed. This representation is very rough, of course, and can be refined in many ways. 
 
Definition 8 (tentative) 
Gross Domestic Product = p.|Y|, where Y  represents private labor transactions. 
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